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The Global Politics of Water Grabbing  
 
By Jennifer Franco, Lyla Mehta and Gert Jan Veldwisch 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The contestation and appropriation of water is not new, but recent 
global debates on land grabbing are bringing increased attention to a water 
perspective in these discussions. Water grabbing takes place in a field that is plural-
legal, both locally and globally. Formal law has been fostering grabs, both in land 
and water. Meanwhile, today’s formal water and land management have been 
separated from each other – an institutional void that makes encroachment even 
easier. Ambiguous processes of global water and land governance have increased 
local level uncertainties and complexities. Powerful players can navigate their ways 
through such uncertainties, making them into mechanisms of exclusion for poor and 
marginalised people. As in formal land management, corporate influence has grown 
in water management. For less powerful players, resolving ambiguities in conflicting 
regulatory frameworks may require tipping the balance in favour of the most 
congenial one. Yet compared to land governance, global water governance is today 
relatively less contested from an equity and water justice perspective, even though 
land is fixed, while water is fluid and part of the hydrological cycle – and therefore 
water grabbing potentially affects greater numbers of diverse water users. Water 
grabbing can be a powerful entry point for contestation, which is needed to build 
counterweights to the neoliberal corporate business led convergence in global 
resource governance discourses and processes. Elaborating a human right to water 




The contestation and appropriation of water is not new, but in the contemporary 
context of a convergence of changing global dynamics around food, climate, energy, 
and finance, and the resulting global debates on land grabbing, there is renewed 
interest in a water perspective on resources grabs.1 Increasing attention to water has 
the potential to (re)invigorate inquiry and action along two lines simultaneously: 1. by 
casting new light on the global land grab phenomenon itself and related issues of land 
governance, while, 2. opening up new windows on old questions of political control, 
social justice and environmental sustainability in relation to use and management of 
water. Since about 2010 evidence has been growing that the rush to control water 
resources is an important cause, as well as effect, of the phenomenon now commonly 
known as land grabbing. Specific attention to water grabbing has been prompted by 
the observation that while land grabbing has received a lot of attention, ‘water as both 
a target and driver of this phenomenon has been largely ignored despite the 
interconnectedness of water and land’.2  
In recent years various studies have put forward strong evidence for 
understanding land grabbing for agriculture (for food, feed, fuel and raw material for 
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industrial use) as having important water dimensions. To illustrate, in many parts of 
sub-Saharan Africa rainfall is too erratic for high investment into agricultural 
production without securing access to reliable water. This is one of the reasons why 
land grabbing for agriculture almost per definition includes water grabbing, even 
when not explicitly specified in the land deals.3;4 Globally most agricultural 
production is based purely on rainwater that has locally infiltrated the soil (so called 
‘green water’), but diverted surface water and pumped-up groundwater (the so called 
‘blue water’) is a far more reliable source for commercial agricultural production.5 
Hence the proliferation of political narratives such as ‘unexploited and underutilised’ 
land and water resources, how they ‘need’ new and large scale investment to ‘unlock’ 
their potential and to awaken Africa’s ‘sleeping giant’ and promote a blue revolution 
in Africa.6;7  Even when investment plans do not specify requirement for water 
beyond rain, experience shows that additional water will have to be mobilised for the 
crops to do well and this may typically be in the most water-scarce period and in 
competition with existing and/or potential future uses.8;9;10 
Beyond agriculture, water grabbing extends into the water, energy, climate 
and mineral domains in ways that highlight the distinct material character of water. In 
short, water may be the context of a grab, it may be the object of a grab, or it may be 
both at the same time. To illustrate, in agriculture-driven grabs, water is a crucial 
context for land grabbing - determining for example ‘which land located where’ is 
desirable or most coveted by investors, usually having some irrigation potential.  
Water can also then become the object of what is primarily an agriculture-driven land 
grab.11 In other cases water itself is the primary object of the grabbing, resulting in 
reallocations of formal and informal water rights and their benefits of use. For 
example, hydropower development in Turkey is made possible through neoliberal 
reforms that transfer exclusive access rights to hundreds of rivers and streams to 
private companies for 49 years.12 In Cajamarca, Peru, large-scale private mining 
operations are prompting big changes in how water rights are allocated, leading to 
detrimental changes in the amount and quality of water available to downstream 
users.13  
As these diverse examples suggest, while land and water are interconnected, a 
focus on the grabbing of water resources helps to bring out an additional, distinct set 
of issues that are linked to the materiality of water. For instance, water availability 
fluctuates across time and space, flows within watershed boundaries and often has 
pronounced dislocated (downstream) effects, in terms of quantities and qualities. 
Moreover, a focus on the grabbing of this materially distinct and finite natural 
resource also uncovers some additional analytical complexities with regard to water 
that have big implications for both policy and political action. For example, it is very 
difficult to pinpoint (the effects of) reallocations, amongst others, due to surface 
water/ groundwater interactions and inter-annual variability, which in some settings 
has important ‘spillover’ implications for policy and political action.14 Meanwhile, in 
other settings, pointing out the threat of reallocation of a natural resource that is so 
crucial for human life may be enough to generate political resistance. The fluidity of 
water thus both complicates and potentially enriches the picture on land grabbing, 
both analytically and empirically – something which researchers looking at the 
contemporary global enclosures are just beginning to explore.  
With these issues and the ongoing build-up of water-grabbing focused case 
material in mind, we find this to be a good moment to take a more systematic look at 
land and water governance – especially at the global level – to see where we are in 
terms of generating knowledge and insights that have relevance for policy and 
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political action. The global level of water related governance mechanisms is 
emphasised here as it has largely been absent in the discussions on the new global 
enclosures. The mechanism and processes through which water grabbing takes shape 
in practice, such as the everyday politics and the role of water technologies, would 
also deserve further scrutiny and theorisation, but are outside the focus of this current 
article. Our analysis builds on discrete policy discussions over uneven access to and 
control of water that go back decades and are not necessarily linked to or coterminous 
with the agrarian question in which much land grabbing research is framed. 
Meanwhile, some of the more land oriented global governance discussions, which 
likewise go back decades, are virtually silent on the question of water. Land and water 
are interconnected, but not the same, and their management and governance have 
been constructed often in isolation from one another historically. There are ‘land 
experts/activists’ and there are ‘water experts/activists’, and seldom do the two 
synergise in matters of governance. Bringing water issues to the fore in this context 
thus involves more than simply adding water to the land grab/ land governance debate 
and stirring. It requires taking stock of ongoing debates around discrete questions of 
water rights, water management, the right to water and water governance, in both the 
land and water domains, and exploring how these potentially inform and eventually 
re-forge the current global debate on land grabbing into a broader and more integrated 
understanding of land-water issues and governance. Such an understanding is needed 
in order to build political contestation toward eventually tipping the balance of power 
in the direction of social and environmental justice. This article aims to contribute to a 
deeper understanding of these issues. We begin by defining how we understand water 
grabbing before exploring the tendency towards neoliberal processes in disparate 
global land and water governance mechanism that facilitate resource grabbing. We 
chart the specific neoliberal turn in water management, growing corporate influence 
in global policy making around water and how seemingly neutral processes such as 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) can serve powerful players’ 
interests. We conclude with some thoughts of how social justice perspectives around 
land and water grabbing processes can be advanced.  
 
Understanding Water Grabbing 
 
Water grabbing is a process in which powerful actors are able to take control of, or 
reallocate to their own benefits, water resources used by local communities or feeding 
aquatic ecosystems on which their livelihoods are based.15 It is one manifestation of a 
wider global trend today involving large scale (re)allocations of natural resources 
more generally. Drawing insight from the discussion on land grabbing, we understand 
water grabbing as the capturing of control not just of the water itself, but also of the 
power to decide how this will be used – by whom, when, for how long and for what 
purposes – in order to control the benefits of use. The fast growing case material on 
land grabbing shows a wider contemporary trend or cycle taking place in the context 
of the intersection of global changes in the food-feed-fuel system, in climate, and in 
global finance and economy, which is driving the further expansion of capitalist 
control over natural resources on a large scale, for purposes of production, extraction, 
and speculation. As many analysts and observers have noted, capture of land and 
water resources by powerful actors is nothing new, but has been happening since 
centuries. It is useful to situate and analyse different episodes of appropriation in their 
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particular historical and institutional context. The current cycle is what we refer to as 
land and water grabbing. 
A key feature of this phenomenon is that the underlying business deals are 
large scale, most visibly in terms of land area and capital involved. There is a strong 
tendency in the literature on land grabbing to try to define land grabbing mainly in 
terms of the physical size of the land acquired.16;17 By incorporating scale of capital 
into the analysis, land, water and other resources become visible as central in the 
operation of capital. A purely land-centred view overlooks the underlying logic and 
operation of capital accumulation.18 For water grabbing, the fixation on size has a 
parallel in a too narrow focus on the volume of water involved, ignoring that access to 
water concerns distribution in time and space.19  Hertzog et al.20 in their study of 
water grabbing in the Office du Niger, demonstrate how important it is to thoroughly 
assess water requirements in space and time, rather than just looking at water 
volumes. This also suggests a need to seriously take into account the notion of scale 
with regard to flows of water, in order to make visible and account more 
systematically for changes in water distribution and water quality.  
We will return to this point later. For now it is useful to point out that our 
approach to water grabbing dialogues with the work of Borras et al. and is likewise 
grounded in a combined political economy, political ecology and political sociology 
approach.21 As such, it seeks to move beyond narrow, proceduralist mainstream 
understandings of the ‘grabbing’ as illegal by definition, which have the disadvantage 
of emphasising the formal-legal quality of the transaction and from there limiting the 
lens on grabbing to only those cases where state law is clearly contravened. Such an 
approach is problematic.  
First, it tends to dismiss deeper interrogation of the actual nature and 
desirability of the outcomes of these ‘transactions’ in terms of the underlying 
development model that the new economic arrangements usher in, including, as 
pointed out by Borras and Franco, changes in land use and land property relations that 
often entail dispossession and ecological destruction.22 How large-scale land and 
water grabs are prompting similar changes in and undermining existing use, 
management and social relations of water, has recently been explored by (among 
others): Williams et al. in Ghana;23 Bues and Theesfeld in Ethiopia;24 Houdret in 
Morocco;25 Duvail et al. in Kenya;26 and Velez Torres in Colombia.27  
Second, it tends to reduce the transaction itself to essentially a technical 
formal-legal procedure, at times even conflating financial accounting with political 
accountability, and thereby underestimating (or ignoring) how the grabbing of natural 
resources is taking place in a historical-institutional field that is plural-legal and 
marked by power asymmetries and thus deeply political, and that in many settings it is 
formal state law that has been fostering the grabs. For land, Wily shows how formal 
law that is supposed to protect vulnerable people can in practice ‘oppress and 
dispossess’.28 On the water front, recent research shows how powerful actors use legal 
means as well as technical definitions to divert water and the benefits of its use away 
from local communities. In India, sectoral reforms are used as a mechanism to 
legalise and legitimise water grabbing processes. The state also takes advantage of the 
obscurity in the policy regime and when challenged on legal grounds, reform 
instruments are blatantly redefined.29 In many cases, state organisations bend or re-
interpret existing rules and regulations that should actually prevent water grabbing, as 
in the case of Ethiopia where the Water Resources Management Proclamation is 
supposed to protect local users.30 In other cases, in various ways, legally required 
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Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) have served as mechanisms for ‘window 
dressing’ water grabbing activities.31;32  
All these studies show that a litmus test of ‘legality’ ultimately offers little 
traction when trying to determine what counts as water (or land) grabbing. In fact, 
grabbers often make use of legally complex situations around water tenure. New 
commercial users usually coexist with complex non-registered users who are 
invisible. This legal pluralism can be both enabling and disabling, but it is often very 
difficult for local users to defend their claims. Companies often strengthen their 
informal social and political networks to influence governance processes. Hertzog et 
al. refer to the latter as ‘a fragmented negotiation process, whereby different investors 
have used different networks in the administrative and political apparatus in order to 
secure both suitable land and water arrangements’.33 Meanwhile, formal water and 
land management are often separated from each other – an institutional void that also 
makes encroachment easier and the separation of land and water rights can contribute 
to creating space for water grabbing to occur.34  
Stepping back, one finds that water grabbing (like land grabbing) is diverse in 
its appearance. Water grabbing 1. is driven by varied forms of state-capital alliances, 
2. is not limited geographically, 3. happens in diverse agro-ecological contexts, 4. is 
unfolding across various water-land property rights regimes and 5. is leading to 
diverse impacts. Each of these points is elaborated below using recent water grabbing-
focused case study material. 
First, the main actors behind diverse grabbing processes are varied forms of 
state-capital alliances, and involving varied types of mechanisms and processes that 
are serving to make the grabs possible – among others: 1. State law and policy 
reforms;35;36 2. State law and new policy interpretations;37;38 3. Violation of state 
law;39;40 4. New public-private interest business coalitions;41;42;43 5. Exploiting legal 
complexity;44;45 and 6. Bypassing democratic accountability processes.46 
Second, water grabbing, like land grabbing, is happening across the globe. 
Many of the most prominent reports and studies, including Woodhouse,47 Woodhouse 
and Ganho,48 Skinner and Cotula,49 tended to focus initially on water grabbing 
happening in Africa, perhaps reinforcing the impression (cultivated in the media) that 
it was a mainly African phenomenon. But empirical evidence shows the unfolding 
throughout Latin America;50;51 across Asia,52;53 in the Middle East and in Eurasia as 
well.54;55  
Third, water grabbing is also happening across various agro-ecological 
contexts: river deltas and floodplains, inland rivers, freshwater lakes, wetlands, as 
well as semi-arid plains and savannah. And fourth, water grabbing, like land 
grabbing, is happening across diverse property rights regimes, including commons 
such as grazing corridors like in the Tana Delta case;56 communal/ community tenure 
and resource management systems;57;58;59;60 land- and waterscapes understood by local 
communities as territory;61;62 and areas under individual private property rights 
regimes.63;64  
Finally, the impacts of water grabbing are diverse. The impacts of land 
grabbing have been distinguished in two broad types: exclusion and adverse 
incorporation.65 However, water grabbing and its impacts appear to be even more 
diverse and ‘slippery’ due to its dislocated, timing-relevant and quality-related 
effects.66 Interventions in the water cycle can for instance 1. disturb the amount of 
groundwater and downstream water available for existing users (exclusion from the 
volume), 2. change the peak and base flows (exclusion in timing), 3. change the agro-
ecological landscape (exclusion from ecosystem benefits that require, for example, 
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occasional flooding), and 4. affect the quality of the water (exclusion from clean and 
safe water). For the latter, water grabbing does not necessarily involve diversion of 
water, but rather pollution of water resources by powerful upstream actors, in a 
process marked by the externalisation of problems and costs (which are transferred 
from the causers to local communities downstream.67;68 These ‘watery’ types of 
exclusion could also be understood in terms of adverse incorporation – i.e. imposing 
water use and management regimes that directly or indirectly ‘incorporate’ people 
into changed water regimes tied to the new economic arrangements.  
 
Global Land and Water Governance 
 
Water grabbing takes place in a field that is plural-legal – i.e. characterised by the 
coexistence of varied and diverse regulatory frameworks and processes shaping who 
gets what kind of access to which water resources and for what purposes. As seen in 
the previous section, much of the empirical work of recent years emphasises this point 
from a local perspective.a But legal pluralism characterises the ‘higher’ levels of the 
political system too, including the global level where plural-legal resource 
‘governance-scapes’ are becoming increasingly apparent. This is certainly the case in 
the land and water domains. As Mehta et al argue, ‘...the multiplication of 
institutional forms and sites of environmental governance and natural resource 
management itself generates greater uncertainty as individuals, social groups, and 
organisations jostle for control over resources and their futures. The result is both that 
conventional theoretical divides between local and global, formal and informal have 
been made redundant, and that ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty increasingly 
characterise the conditions under which resources are governed and managed’.69 
Powerful players can navigate their ways through such uncertainties, making them 
into mechanisms of exclusion for poor and marginalised people, and facilitate 
grabbing processes.  
In this section we review the main global processes that govern and attempt to 
regulate water access, use and distribution of benefits and burdens of these. We 
describe this scene in terms of an ongoing build-up of structures, institutions, and 
discourses. This has been happening in a fragmented fashion historically, resulting in 
separate regulatory activities that are relatively unconnected. The discussion traces 
their disparate trajectories and tries to reveal what each may be contributing to 
regulating water grabbing. We argue that these global level ambiguities are 
reinforcing an overall regulatory setting which is highly permissive to water grabbing 
when political contestation from a social justice perspective is either weak or absent.  
Globally, numerous competing governance mechanisms have emerged around 
the issue of global capital engaging with local natural resources. High profile 
governance initiatives addressing land use, management and access in relation to 
agriculture thus include, among others: 1. the World Bank led ‘Principles of 
Responsible Agricultural Investment’ or PRAI; 2. the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United States (FAO) based ‘Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of 
national food security’ or FAO-TG; 3. the ongoing FAO- Responsible Agricultural 
                                                        
a A legal pluralism lens helps to situate law as a complex and contested socio-political process that 
unfolds unevenly over time and space and generates variable and contingent results that are open to 
competing interpretations.  
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Investment, or FAO-RAI process, and 4. more lately the G8’s ‘Land Transparency 
Initiative’ or G8LTI. None of these initiatives deal much or at all with issues of water 
access, use and distribution of benefits and burdens. Although ‘land tenure security’ is 
a major concern in all of these initiatives, they are not necessarily referring to the 
same thing, while at the same time land remains the main focus of regulation. Despite 
the growing visibility of water grabbing these agriculture-oriented governance 
initiatives have tended to neglect a wide and deep range of issues related to water. 
The highly contentious political process that led to the recently adopted FAO-
Tenure Guidelines (FAO-TGs) warrant special attention since it constitutes the most 
recent site of struggle in the ‘proxy war’ between competing views and interpretations 
of natural resources.70;71 The FAO-TGs mark an important step forward in elaborating 
a human right to land as they are ‘the first international instrument which applies an 
ESC-Rights based approach to the governance of land’.72 Though the understanding 
of land in these guidelines has its problems and contradictions, the situation is even 
worse with respect to water, since water was excluded from coverage.b During the 
final negotiations, the effort by civil society to get water into the guidelines ran up 
against opposition and resistance from other participants who denounced water and 
water governance as ‘too complicated’.c For whatever the FAO-TGs are worth, this 
poses a major ambiguity since water is indeed deeply and inextricably interconnected 
with other natural resources.d 
The FAO-TGs and other agriculture-oriented governance initiatives have 
emerged against the backdrop of competing (and still evolving) international 
regulatory frameworks. One of these competing frameworks is international human 
rights law, which served as a crucial source of inspiration, guidance and support to the 
civil society delegation throughout the FAO-TG formulation process, while seeming 
to provoke much discomfort and disdain from some government delegations. 
Although there is still a long way to go and progress has been uneven, international 
human rights law has been slowly moving toward authoritative establishment of land, 
water and associated resources such as fisheries and forests as matters of human 
rights. This has for instance led to the inclusion of access to land as part of ‘the right 
to feed oneself’.73 Although there is as yet no distinct human right to land, the 
pressure to establish such a right remains.74 There is a globally recognised right to 
water but it remains conceptually ambiguous and so far has had limited value in being 
a countervailing force against grabbing processes.  
The human right to water was the result of decades of intense global struggle 
and lobbying, as it was initially resisted by powerful players in the water domain and 
countries such as Canada and the USA. It was not explicitly recognised in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent declarations. In July 2010, 
the UN General Assembly and later in September 2010 the UN Human Rights 
                                                        
b No mention of water is made beyond a single reference to the governance of water and other 
“associated natural resources”, such as for instance fisheries, by national states on basis of their own 
“different models and systems of governance” (Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and FAO, 
2012: iv). 
c One of the authors was present when the proposal to include water was voted down by the 
governments as being “too complicated”.  
d This leaves small scale fishers vulnerable to other governance initiatives, which have the potential to 
facilitate “ocean-grabbing” (see World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP) and World Forum of Fish 
Harvesters and Fish Workers (WFF) 2013 “Call for Governments to Stop Supporting the Global 
Partnership for Oceans (GPO) and Rights-Based Fishing (RBF) Reforms”, available at: 
http://masifundise.org.za/press-statement-by-the-world-forum-of-fisher-peoples-in-response-to-the-
global-partnership-for-oceans/).  
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Council, finally recognised access to clean water and sanitation as a human right. This 
official recognition was a great victory for the global water justice movement and has 
been used as a powerful mobilising tool for water struggles all around the world.  
South Africa, Ecuador, Bolivia, Gambia, Tanzania, Uruguay and others have 
recognised the human right to water, thereby committing to respect, protect and fulfil 
the right of access to safe and affordable domestic water services. But all over the 
world there remains a considerable gap between human rights talk and human rights 
practice and governments are usually constrained in their financial commitments to 
achieving universal access to water and sanitation. There is often a clear tension 
between a government’s commitment to rights and to market-based mechanisms, with 
the latter tending to prevail. Bolivia, for example, has been at the forefront of 
international campaigns to recognise the human right to water. Yet, domestically, the 
Morales government has been criticised for pursuing economic development policies 
based on industrialisation and extractive industry expansion that are elite-driven and 
often violate local people’s human rights to water and water rights.75 South Africa 
was the first country to provide constitutional recognition of the human right to water 
and in 2001 the Free Basic Water Policy was introduced, which aimed to provide a 
basic supply of water to all households free of charge. At the same time, the South 
African water policies were also informed by market-driven approaches to water 
management, including an emphasis on cost recovery, user fees for water and 
controversial cut offs which have violated poor people’s basic rights to water.76  
Human rights, like any rights, are open to interpretation, which makes 
ensuring a social justice interpretation a matter of political power and strategic 
political action. In the case of the human right to food, the office of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food has traditionally served as an important rallying 
point for civil society organisations and social movements seeking to realise a social 
justice interpretation. By contrast, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Water 
has taken a quite different approach, issuing reports stating that ‘the human rights 
framework does not express a preference over models of service provision’ and that 
‘human rights are neutral as to economic models’.77 Thus, it is not surprising that big 
global water corporations such as Suez have publicly declared that they ’strongly 
believe’ in the right to water.e So far the human right to water has not been deployed 
to countervail water grabbing processes, partly because of its limited scope to 
domestic, rather than productive uses of water. Unlike the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food, who has frequently commented on land grabs, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Water has been reluctant to engage with water grabbing 
issues.  
The other main competing international regulatory framework is being 
consolidated in an array of free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral trade 
agreements (BITs) building on legalist corporate business law discourses, principles, 
definitions and their underlying assumptions. Many social and environmental justice 
activists working on a wide range of concerns see these trade agreements as 
fundamentally at odds not only with human rights law, but also with democratic 
governance more broadly. They complicate national efforts to regulate environmental, 
labour, domestic content questions and treat national legislation on these matters as 
measures in restraint of trade, which are potentially actionable in the dispute 
resolution mechanisms of the FTAs or World Trade Organisation (WTO).f The rise of 
                                                        
e http://www.suez-environnement.com/water/challenges/promoting-access-water-sanitation/  
Accessed May 1, 2013 
f Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the latter perspective.  
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a corporate-business law agenda in recent decades results from the project to 
institutionalise and consolidate neoliberalism internationally by strengthening markets 
while shrinking states,78 and is expressed through law and policies on trade and 
investment, which ‘play a crucial role in building the global supply chains that are 
part of the modern international economy’.g Narratives that justify land and water 
grabbing play an important role in facilitating these processes. In addition to the 
narrative of ‘marginal’ and ‘idle’ lands as ‘underexploited resources’, there is also the 
‘economic scarcity’ narrative. Such narratives have been serving to justify the 
involvement of the private sector in irrigation on the twin argument that public funds 
are short while private funds are more efficient with regard to water use. Since the 
1990s, FTAs and BITs have been opening up new opportunities for foreign investors 
to bypass national laws and to question proposed government regulations before 
international tribunals if profits are threatened. National governments are known to 
refrain from (or resist) enacting human rights-based social and environmental 
regulation within their own borders. Linked to these developments are the reforms of 
the water and energy sectors promoted by multilateral and regional banks encouraging 
privatisation and deregulation, often in the name of efficiency.  
If the most prominent contemporary global governance mechanisms shaping 
the land domain today offer little concrete guidance or practical insight on how to 
deal with land and water grabbing, neither do the main global governance 
mechanisms that exist more specifically for water. Contemporary water governance at 
the global level is an arena arguably characterised by a higher degree of ambiguity 
resulting from competing formal-regulatory actors and official processes, with few 
agreed rules or procedures regarding decision-making. Even the UN Watercourses 
Convention, the global water convention specifically related to the governance, use 
and management of watercourses has not been ratified by sufficient countries to enter 
into force.h Because there are very few formal agreements, there is no single clear-cut 
global water regime with agreed-upon rules of the game providing normative 
prescriptions, clear expectations and institutionalised relationships.79  
Partly this is because water is not really a global issue or a ‘global public 
good’. Despite the existence of the global hydrological cycle, water remains highly 
localised or at best regional in scope. Water availability is variable across time and 
space and dependents on factors such as climate, season and temperature, making it 
very difficult to provide blanket statements and solutions regarding the global state of 
water. Access to water between countries, within regions and countries, and between 
women and men is highly unequal and water shortages affect different social groups 
differently, whilst hitting the poorest the hardest. Even though the ‘global’ nature of 
water is difficult to capture, and there is no single overall clear-cut global water 
regime, there is nonetheless an emerging global water regime (ibid).80 This emerging 
water governance regime at the global level could best be described as plural-legal, 
encompassing several separate regulatory orders, each with its own field of action and 
institutional logic. Examples at the global level include the dams movement, 
convergences around the neo-liberalisation of water, international consensus around 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), and the water footprint discourse.  
It is relevant to briefly look more closely here at the water footprint discourse. 
In assessing water grabbing, ‘water footprint accounting’, which demonstrates flows 
of ‘virtual water’ as ‘embedded’ in products, has been suggested as a useful tool.81 
                                                        
g Seattle to Brussels Network, 2012, p.22 
h www.gcint.org/what-we-do/water-peace/un-watercourses-convention , accessed 1 May 2013.  
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But water footprint tools have not included the political nature of water distribution, 
especially at the local level.82 For instance, water footprint accounting does show that 
through the import of Peruvian asparagus large amounts of virtual water is imported,83 
but it does not differentiate between an asparagus produced under industrial 
agriculture with devastating effects on the local economy and depleting a non-
renewable aquifer on the one hand and an asparagus produced under robust family 
farming with renewable (rain)water.84 In that respect water footprint accounting has 
very limited value in the assessment of global water grabbing and in some cases, they 
could even facilitate grabbing processes due assumed ‘higher water productivity’.  
Zooming back out to look at the broader picture, each of the different global 
regulatory orders for water have their own networks of experts, including economists, 
engineers, policy professionals, consultants and so on. Many supra-national 
organisations such as the World Commission on Dams, the World Water Council 
(WWC) and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) are currently addressing global 
problems and issues concerning water. Even though UN agencies have water 
programmes, there is no one major UN agency devoted to water and the one that does 
exist, UN Water, established in 2003 as a UN inter-agency coordination mechanism, 
remains a virtual institute with little influence. The GWP was founded in 1996 to 
champion the case of IWRM around the world. The World Water Council is a 
controversial elite international body based in Marseille established by the World 
Bank and members from French water companies operating around the world and 
other water policy experts. Added to the mix, is the current engagement of corporate 
players in water management, playing a key role in determining water security and 
insecurity. Even though these supranational organisations lack global legitimacy, they 
are powerful in shaping dominant debates and on-going processes.  
Amidst increasing complexity and uncertainty, disparate global processes are 
interacting in a mutually reinforcing way to shape the way land and water are being 
allocated and reallocated. This is seen especially around processes of 
commodification and financialisation of natural resources, with land and water 
grabbing as both cause and effect.85;86;87 This process has been termed liberal 
environmentalism or market environmentalism. 88;89 Land and water are increasingly 
taken strictly as an economic asset, either in productive, extractive or speculative 
directions. The convergence is therefore a reflection of the ideological ascendancy of 
neoliberal corporate power across domains. There is a danger that this leads to the 
establishment of an overarching global legal framework for natural resources that 
‘secures’ rights to these from a corporate-business/investor-protection perspective. 
Recent debates around the ‘securitisation of the environment’, accompanied by talk of 
future threats to human security and the ‘food-energy-water nexus’ that is driving new 
hydropower and energy developments and promoting the inclusion of new corporate 
players are all pointing in this direction.  
 
 
 Privatisation, commodification and water reforms 
 
In this section we look more closely at global processes that are interacting to shape 
the way water is allocated and reallocated and water grabbing is taking place. We do 
this by sketching the historical background of what marked the neo-liberal turn in the 
water sector: the Dublin declaration and the subsequent processes of water 
privatisation, commodification and eventually also its financialisation (section 4.1). 
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The discourse of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and its key 
principles have become highly influential all over the world. The ways in which 
IWRM policies and principles can form the playing field through which many of the 
water grabs take shape are elaborated in section 4.2. In section 4.3 we conclude with a 
discussion on the growing influence of the corporate sector.  
 
. From Delhi to Dublin and the neoliberal turn in water  
  
Water has been the focus of global collective action. Yet, despite repeated principles, 
declarations and meetings nearly 800 million people lack access to safe water for 
drinking. The Mar del Plata Conference (1977) was the first – and still the only – 
global conference on water held under United Nations auspices. This led directly to 
the UN ‘Water Decade’ (1981-1990) which aimed at achieving universal coverage to 
drinking water and sanitation by 1990. At the end of the decade the target remained 
far off. To assess what had happened and to look towards future pathways for 
collective action, in 1990 the UN held a global consultation in New Delhi hosted by 
the Indian Government. Under the slogan, ‘Some for all rather than all for some’, the 
New Delhi Statement stressed (1) Protection of the environment and safeguarding of 
health through the integrated management of water resources and liquid and solid 
wastes (2) Institutional reforms promoting an integrated approach (3) Community 
management of services, backed by measures to strengthen local institutions and (4) 
Sound financial practices, achieved through better management of existing assets, and 
widespread use of appropriate technologies.90 
The New Delhi Statement, with its focus on equity and universality, was 
rapidly overshadowed by the ‘Dublin Statement’ of 1992 – an important turning point 
in the global discourse on water governance. The statement emerged from the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) held in Dublin in 
January 1992. It was organised by water experts and held under the auspices of the 
World Meteorological Organization. The conference culminated in the formulation of 
the Dublin principles which recognised (1) the finite nature of water and its key role 
in sustaining life, development and the environment; (2) the importance of 
participatory approaches in water development and management; (3) the central role 
played by women in the provision, management and safeguarding of water and (4) the 
economic and competing values of water and the need to recognise water as an 
economic good (International Conference on Water and the Environment, 1992). It is 
this fourth principle that has made Dublin a focus of policy differences and global 
fault lines ever since. Declaring water an ‘economic good’ in Dublin remains to this 
day deeply controversial. Many in the global water community still feel this not only 
legitimises the ‘commodification’ of a life-giving resource, but also continues to 
justify potential privatisation and resource capture (including water grabs). Strictly 
speaking, ‘economic goods’ are goods that are scarce and legitimise human action and 
market intervention.91 
The controversial declaration of water as an economic good must be seen as a 
logical next step from the sustainability paradigm that has its roots in the late 1970s in 
combination with the neo-liberal turn to economics more generally. The sustainability 
perspective amongst others raises the question of financial sustainability, i.e. the 
ability to generate finances to sustain and maintain a particular use. But there are 
some water needs and uses that lie outside the gamut of economic valuation. By its 
focus on water as an economic good, Dublin provided a solid building block for a 
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global discourse that evaluates water distribution in the first place on its economic 
value.  
Corporate agriculture, mining, hydropower and other capital intensive 
economic activities are often seen as more important contributors to economic growth 
than smallholder agriculture, community drinking water and traditional fisheries. The 
latter may have a place in national development policies, but usually are then framed 
within the realm of ‘subsistence’ rather than being seen as sectors that can provide a 
long-term sustainable contribution to a country’s development. In other cases peasant 
agriculture and traditional fisheries are completely ignored and the areas in which 
these are important declared ‘vacant’, ‘unused’, ‘empty’ or at least ‘underutilised’. 
For Mozambique Beekman and Veldwisch demonstrate how discourses and policies 
that favour foreign direct investments over investing in smallholder agriculture 
encourage local water grabbing processes.92 There are many other cases in which 
these dichotomies between smallholders and commercial investments are well 
observable in national processes, policies and discourses.93;94;95 
The shifts in paradigms around water provision and management as expressed 
in the Dublin statement must be viewed in conjunction with the rise of the neoliberal 
agenda of the early 1990s which entailed a shift away from viewing governments as 
responsible for poor people’s needs and problems. Instead, the state was required to 
play a facilitating and regulatory role without direct engagement. The Washington 
Consensus of the 1990s thus saw changes in how basic services such as water were 
governed, which included budget cutbacks, privatisation and de-regulation often 
legitimised through processes of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment. 
After Dublin the World Bank began to play a central role in water and sanitation and 
water has moved away from being viewed as a common good and a public service to 
a commodity that is being managed according to economic principles.96 This led to 
controversial water privatisations around the world, details of which cannot be 
discussed here.97;98;99  
Twenty years on from the Dublin Conference, we are witnessing the 
privatisation not just of the service and infrastructure but of the resource itself. In 
recent years, water is being transformed into a commodity tradable on large scale 
global markets through water trading schemes – leading to the financialisation of 
water resources and the management of water in the hands of financial markets.100 In 
Chile it has been possible to buy and sell different types of water rights since 1981 
and its water market is considered an important policy model on which various other 
countries, such as Mexico, Argentina and Morocco have based their policies.101 In 
Uganda, the controversial Bujagali dam, which is being resisted by local communities 
around the Nile, is being financed by the hedge fund Blackstone in partnership with 
the World Bank and the European investment bank.102 These and other examples 
highlighted in this section have outlined the diverse trajectories of neoliberalism that 
have led to the dominant discourse of water as an economic and tradable good whose 
market value supersedes its cultural and social values.  
 
IWRM: Fluidity of a concept 
 
The concept of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), as practised around 
the world since about two decades, emerged as an elaboration of the 1992 Dublin 
principles. The most frequently used definition of IWRM comes from the Global 
Water Partnership and is defined as ‘a process which promotes the coordinated 
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development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to 
maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’.103 Despite these laudable aims, 
IWRM is rather a vague, diffuse and amorphous concept and it remains unclear what 
should be integrated and by whom.104 However, it still remains a highly attractive 
concept precisely because of its capacious nature which provides a lot of space for 
interpretation and due to its ideal typical nature of what good water management 
should look like.105  
IWRM seeks to achieve a maximisation of Economy, Equity and Ecosystems. 
However, it is rarely acknowledged that these goals are often ‘antagonistic [..], that 
'trade-offs are necessary and hard to achieve in such situations’.106 IWRM thus 
‘obscure[s] the political nature of natural resources management; and [is] easily 
hijacked by groups seeking to legitimise their own agendas’.107 All this can make 
IWRM an apolitical cloak for processes that are deeply transformative and involve the 
re-allocation of limited water resources. In what follows we direct attention to two 
aspects of many IWRM influenced water reforms that are important for water 
grabbing dynamics: (1) decentralisation according to hydrographical boundaries and 
the involvement of water users water management and (2) the licensing of water 
abstraction. While these reforms may have contributed to democratising water 
management in some ways, our purpose here is to show how they can also 
unwittingly contribute to water grabbing.  
 
Decentralisation of water management 
In the water sector decentralisation in practice means the re-organisation of water 
governance from administrative units (e.g. districts) to units that coincide with 
hydrographical boundaries (e.g. basins). This provides an opportunity to deal with the 
dislocated effects of water use (e.g. pollution). Decentralisation policies and 
approaches often involve the setting up of Water Users Associations (WUAs) and/or 
River Basin Organisations (RBOs) which are now important exemplary ‘models’ in 
the water sector  
The WUA and RBO models include an emphasis on participation of water 
users in water management. A large body of literature highlights the mixed 
experiences with user involvement in water management at all levels of 
governance.108;109;110;111  For example, the involvement of users in water management 
does not prevent strong actors to capture unfair shares of water. Rather, user 
participation often becomes the forum through which the resource capture is taking 
shape, often facilitated by excluding the informal, legally not-recognised water users. 
Kemerink et al. analyse in detail for a case in South Africa how, despite the best of 
intentions, a policy of user participation in water management through the 
establishment of a Water Users Association (WUA) is used by the most powerful 
actors in the catchment to maintain the status quo of a highly unequal water 
distribution pattern established in the Apartheid era.112 Warner et al. refer to various 
cases of participatory water management in which the process was used as a 
mechanism to delay decisions to the benefit of vested interests.113  
More recently participatory processes have come to form the stage of 
appropriation processes and are used to legitimise water grabbing, though this does 
not mean that these processes cannot also be used to resist capture. In many countries 
licences for large-scale land and water investments are subject to an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) that includes stakeholder consultations. When investors get 
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a license they could be expected to have passed through this stakeholder consultation 
process. However, these processes are often flawed and end up justifying the 
investment and silencing further resistance due to the completion of the stakeholder 
consultation exercises. Examples of such processes with regards to water grabbing 
have recently been documented for cases in Ghana,114 Mozambique,115 and Kenya.116 
 
Regulation and control through permit systems 
Permit systems are an integral part of IWRM frameworks and have been drawn up in 
many countries. Van Koppen shows how formal administration-based water rights 
systems in Sub Saharan Africa have tended to dispossess the informal majority by 
design, as ‘permit systems boil down to the formal dispossession of rural informal 
water users who manage their water under community-based arrangements’ (p.48). 
Water rights that have historically been arranged locally are now declared subject to 
formalisation under national law. Existing rights are cancelled-out with the promise to 
include them in the new law. In practice many of these rights are not (and often 
cannot) be included in the registration and licensing leading to a weakening of the 
position of historical smallholder use. Complicated and expensive license application 
procedures ensure that water permits ‘favour the administration-proficient' (p.46).117 
Dispossession through licensing is a prominent mechanism in the current era of global 
resource grabs. 
Many of the colonial permit systems were designed for dispossessing rural 
informal water users and van Koppen has argued that recently introduced or revised 
permit systems, based on such colonial logic, are de facto facilitating water grabs.118 
Small scale water use, for drinking water and small productive use, is in many 
systems excluded from licensing, granting it a status of exemption, which according 
to Hodgson cannot be considered to be a right.119 In practice this ignores pluralistic 
legal systems in which traditional legal systems govern the thousands of smallholders 
that are deemed uncontrollable under the registration system.120 In South Africa 
general authorisations are exemptions for larger volumes in designated areas.121 In 
Mozambique, these exempted uses are called uso común, or common use, and in 
Zimbabwe they are referred to as ‘primary uses’.122 In Islamic law rights to drinking 
water, formulated as ‘rights to thirst’ also have a priority.123 
It is questionable whether these de minimis rights provide any security in 
practical terms, as this type of ‘entitlement cannot lawfully prevent anyone else from 
also using the resource even if that use affects his own prior use/entitlement’.124 
Formal permits with state backing create first-class rights in comparison to any other 
right.125 The exemption from a need for a permit keeps small-scale users from being 
registered as users, which makes it easier to overlook them in planning and allocation 
procedures, as for instance happened in a water grabbing case in 
Mozambique.126;127;128 In Kenya nomadic livestock keepers and fisher folk without 
formal water licences were dispossessed of their traditional rights when large scale 
investors started developing the Tana River Delta.129 In many cases, smallholders are 
even aware that their historic agricultural water rights are not recognised in national 
legal frameworks and that this facilitated water grabbing.  A formal right to 
abstraction of community drinking water does not guarantee that this cannot in 
practice be dispossessed through a land and water grab.130 In Peru smallholder 
irrigators’ formalised water right did not help to protect them against a water grab by 
a mining company.131 In the context of limited registration of smallholder water use, 
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poor hydrological knowledge, and/or weak enforcement, permits provide an ‘easy 
way in’ for newcomers, while giving them the formal backing of the state.132 
 
Growing corporate influence in water management 
 
We now turn to the growing influence of corporate players in water resources 
management and water policy debates.133;134;135 This is different from privatisation of 
water supply services which largely concerns urban water provision. Players include 
transnational corporations (TNCs) who use large volumes of water (to produce 
beverages, crops and services) that are engaging globally in debates about water 
management and to protect their access to water supply in the face of growing 
shortages.  The heads of 40 major TNCs recently issued a communiqué to heads of 
governments calling for decisive action to strengthen ‘the enabling environment’ for 
water resources management around the world.136 Other groupings include the ‘2030 
Water Resources Group’ which is a platform of private sector companies, one 
international NGO (the World Wide Fund for Nature, WWF), some aid agencies and 
some national governments (e.g. China, India and Mexico). The 2030 Water 
Resources Group seeks to play a key role in water resources management at the basin 
scale, a function that historically is vested with the state. Instruments deployed 
include information sharing of data of water availability accrued through so called 
‘water tool risks’, a range of convening stakeholders as well as engagement with 
communities.137 However, business interests could triumph over altruistic ones. Water 
availability data can be framed to serve certain interests and stakeholder engagement 
may just be very symbolic. Finally, national governments may prioritise business 
interests and the scope of foreign revenue generation over the local interests and 
questions of environmental integrity.  
Companies are also spearheading innovation and action in water use in the 
beverages sector. One example is Coca Cola which operates in about 200 countries 
and has 300 bottling partners.138 Coke has set a target to improve water-use efficiency 
in its plants by 20% by 2012 against a 2004 baseline. The company claimed in 2010 
that it has achieved six years of consecutive reduction along with a 16% reduction on 
the 2004 baseline.139 But as Box 1 demonstrates there are many contradictions in the 






Franco, Mehta and Veldwisch - Version submitted to TWQ - 28 August 2013 16 
India 
Across India, movements have emerged against Coca-Cola due to alleged water grabs and water 
contamination According to local people, Coca-Cola was extracting 1.5 million litres of water per day in a 
plant located in Plachimada, resulting in a drop in the water table from 150 to 500 feet. Waste deposits from 
the plant also made the water in the surrounding wells, fields and canals unfit for drinking. The plant was 
closed on 17 February 2004. This movement triggered new demands against the 87 other Coca-Cola and 
Pepsi plants in India where water had been depleted and polluted.  Coca-Cola claims that these claims are 
unjustified and points to an independent report undertaken by the Energy and Resources Institute, known 
as TERI which assessed its practices in India. TERI found the plants to be complying with the government 
regulations. However, even this report states that Coca-Cola must take into account local community needs 




Mexico is currently the number one Coca-Cola consuming nation in the world. The beverage has attained 
religious significance in places like San Juan Chamula in the state of Chiapas, replacing traditional 
beverages used in religious ceremonies and used as dowry payment for marriage (Rovira 2000).  The 
company has strong political connections. Vicente Fox, México´s former president was the President of the 
Coca-Cola Corporation of Mexico before coming to power and during his mandate Coca-Cola started to 
bottle water from water-rich Chiapas and the drink is often handed out for free during local elections by 
those in power.   
However, the main reason for its immense consumption is the lack of potable water, making Mexico the 
second largest consumer of bottled water, most of which is largely owned by Coca-Cola.  Since 2000, Coca-
Cola has been allowed to extract water from 19 aquifers and 15 rivers and also has concessions to dump 
waste in public water. In 2003, the company paid $20,ooo to compensate for overextracting water while the 
profits of one bottling plant alone reached $40,000. (Sources: Bell 2006; Rovira 2000; Wooters 2008) 
 
Box 1: Coca Cola in India and Mexico 
 
The activities of TNCs have largely been welcomed by dominant players in 
the water sector. In 2012, Pepsico and in 2011, Nestlé controversially won the 
Stockholm Industry Water Award for leadership,i performance and efforts to improve 
water management in its supply chain and also for its work with local farmers at the 
World Water Week in Stockholm, the annual mecca of water experts worldwide.  
Nestlé is one of the world’s largest corporations involved in food. Like Coke 
and Pepsico, it has massive structural and bargaining power over the world economy 
and trade policies including virtual water flows embedded in trade.140 Nestlé, like 
Coca Cola, is playing a leading role in corporate water accountability which includes 
paying attention to how farmers manage their water and active engagement in various 
corporate networks around water.141 According to Genetic Resources Action 
International (GRAIN), companies such as Bunge (one of the world’s largest 
agribusiness corporations) are also making direct investments in land as part of the 
global rush for land.142 Pepsico, after winning an award at World Water Week in 
Stockholm in 2012 for water efficiency (20% per unit four years ahead of its 2012 
goal) announced the next day that it was seeking the right business model to 
significantly expand operations in Africa and ‘thrive in this market of one billion 
people’.143  
While some may argue that the growing corporate influence in water 
management has yet no clear implications for water grabbing, their emerging strategic 
                                                        
i The Stockholm Industry Water Award recognizes companies within the business sector that have 
demonstrated their commitment to advance the world´s water situation by achieving impressive 
performance in their water usage (http://www.siwi.org/prizes/stockholm-industry-water-award).  
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influence on policy making does have risks and implications for current and future 
grabbing processes. These include the potential re-allocation of water to the ‘highest 
economic value’ having detrimental impacts on local lives, livelihoods and water and 
food security. Also there is a significant gap between the promotional instruments 
deployed by companies and what they are actually doing on the ground. The case of 
Coca Cola illustrates these issues. Despite commitments to ‘shared risks’ and to 
sustainable water management, risks are often unequally shared and new water 
stresses may be created. Furthermore, companies are often more legally bound to be 
accountable to distant shareholders than to local stakeholders, who are often voiceless 
and powerless. Due to their structural, bargaining power and influence over global 
and national policies and processes, they shape and frame powerful discourses, 
subjecting water governance institutions to processes of capture.144  
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
 
The slippery nature of water grabbing means that it is difficult to pinpoint the effects 
of reallocations, amongst others, due to surface water/ groundwater interactions and 
inter-annual variability. These characteristics of water have important implications for 
those interested in either regulating or contesting them. This may partly help to 
explain why local communities have reacted in different ways to land and water 
grabbing. The fluidity of water (and dislocated effects of water grabbing) and 
‘invisibility’ of customary water rights systems can complicate the task of ‘framing’ 
water grabbing as really happening and as an injustice warranting a serious and 
systematic political response. Global governance mechanisms need to address these 
local complexities as well as two other challenges, namely the (in)visibility of 
customary access, use and management systems vis-à-vis formal state law; and the 
complexity of the regulatory field as both plural with overlapping regulatory orders 
and fragmented (separate state agencies for land vs. water vs. forests vs. fisheries). 
As in the land sector, formalisation of rights in the water sector is increasingly 
seen as a universal solution; but the underlying issue is: formalising what? Rights that 
have historically been arranged locally are now declared subject to formalisation 
under national law, and in the context of limited registration of smallholder water use, 
poor hydrological knowledge, and/or weak enforcement, permits provide an ‘easy 
way in’ for newcomers, while giving them the formal backing of the state.145 
Moreover, some of the security provided by customary arrangements to women and 
small-holders through informal and kinship arrangements also get eroded, apart from 
this being a highly bureaucratic process.  
Even if formalisation could be a possible ‘answer’ it can truly only be an 
effective answer if what is being ‘formalised’ is water as a human right, prioritising 
the wellbeing and livelihoods of the poor, marginalised and vulnerable with regard to 
access, use and control. As has been noted, the human right to water was the result of 
decades of intense global struggle and lobbying, and this official recognition was a 
great victory for the global water justice movement. But so far debates around the 
right to water have had very limited effect on water resource management and in the 
mainstream have very narrowly been interpreted as the right to safe drinking water, 
neglecting the need for productive uses of water. The Special Rapporteur for the 
Right to Water and Sanitation also seems to under-serve the cause of human rights by 
claiming that rights are market-neutral and by remaining agnostic. Instead, human 
rights need to be actively used as a counter-veiling force against commodification. 
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Here we are calling for both a stronger social justice perspective to the right to water 
as well as a broader definition of the human right to water, encompassing both 
domestic and productive uses so integral for survival and wellbeing.  
In this article we explored the significance of global land and water 
governance initiatives for water grabbing at the national and local level. We 
demonstrated how disparate and seemingly isolated global processes have led to a 
domination of neoliberal discourses and trends. In the field of water management it is 
exemplary that the Dublin conference became the most important watershed moment 
and thus won out over earlier processes such as Delhi in which there was a stronger 
focus on equity and universality. The Dublin declaration and its popularity reflect the 
dominant Washington Consensus of the 1990s which also influenced environmental 
governance. In water management, this has led to clear neoliberal tendencies, 
elaborated alongside policies of integration, participation, water rights formalisation 
and basin management. After privatisation of water services now privatisation and 
financialisation of the resource itself is taking place. Similar to IWRM policies, with 
its 20-year-old roots, new trends, such as drawing attention to the food-energy-water 
nexus, reinforce a call for integrated governance while at the same time legitimising 
increased corporate involvement. Fuzzy and ambiguous processes of global water and 
land governance are thus increasing local level uncertainties and complexities. 
Usually powerful players can navigate their ways through such uncertainties, making 
them into mechanisms of exclusion for poor and marginalised people.  
For less powerful players, resolving ambiguities in conflicting regulatory 
frameworks may require tipping the balance toward the most favourable one. This 
may not be as impossible as it might seem. As Margulies et al. point out, political-
institutional uncertainties in global governance can also potentially become 
opportunities for previously excluded actors and ideas to be heard and make an 
impact, by creating unexpected ‘… opportunities for policy entrepreneurs and new 
ideas to enter global policy spaces that may set governance along new pathways’.146  
How to convert this potential into actual gains from a social justice 
perspective is a big challenge. When understood as the capturing of control not just of 
the water itself, but also of the power to decide how this will be used and by whom, 
water grabbing is a potentially powerful entry point for increasing contestation and 
building resistance to the neoliberal corporate business led convergence in global 
resource governance discourses and processes. Control grabbing is perhaps best seen 
as a contingent process, marked by conflict, negotiation, friction, that can end up 
ratifying an existing balance of power. Although poor people often do lose out, under 
certain conditions, their political action can make a positive difference. Yet compared 
to land grabbing, water grabbing appears today relatively less contested from an 
equity and water justice perspective, much less an agrarian justice and environmental 
justice perspective, even though the materiality of water means that water grabbing 
potentially affects greater numbers of diverse water users. If done systematically, 
applying a water lens to grabbing situations can help to open up vistas for possible 
political action that has the potential to challenge dominant governance processes: 
a. Far-reaching spillover effects of specifically water grabbing widens the 
space/time field of impacts, suggests the value of and need for more 
systematic horizontal and vertical alliance-building amongst affected 
people. There is a need to go beyond the fixation with water volumes to 
focus on issues of access, quality, timing and control.  
b. Water has crucial importance for sustaining human life, which makes that 
grabbing of land and water potentially affects all kinds of users directly in 
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their sustenance of life. This reinforces the need to build alliances across 
land and water sectors. 
 
It is unlikely that such a perspective will just simply materialise on its own; 
social pressure and strategic political action is needed. The human right to food may 
also have potential as a basis for organising strategic political action and building 
cross-class and multi-sectoral alliances, similar to how it has served as an important 
focal point for agrarian justice and land rights activism. For whatever problems there 
are with the FAO-TGs, they can potentially still be used to pressure governments, 
since water is indeed deeply and inextricably interconnected with the other natural 
resources that are covered (land, fisheries and forests) and which are framed in the 
context of food security and the right to food. 
Finally, our analysis points to a need for land and water rights advocates to 
begin more systematic engagements with each other around elaborating a human right 
to land and water that can off-set or build counterweights to the neoliberal corporate 
business led convergence we are seeing in global resource governance discourses and 
processes, which are imposing views of land and water as tradable economic assets. 
This would mean elaborating a human rights perspective to land and to water that is 
both more interconnected, more social justice oriented and encompasses productive 
uses of water. 
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